allowing the marketplace to function unfettered where possible, and intervening to compensate for market failures 1 such as the inability or unwillingness of telecommunications ventures to provide both basic telephone while investing in the networks capable of providing advanced broadband services, especially in rural areas. Arguably any form of government intervention distorts the competitive playing field, so attempts to remedy market failures should occur only after a determination, corroborated by empirical evidence, that government ought to regulate, create financial incentives, or facilitate the flow of subsidies from the national treasury, or from one group of consumers to others.
Too often politically adept stakeholders have learned how to game the legislative and regulatory process with an eye toward tilting the competitive playing field by securing unwarranted competitive advantages that were designed to promote the public interest and remedy market failures. Incumbent carriers in particular have mastered the legislative and regulatory process and 1 Markets typically reach an equilibrium that balances supply with demand. Governments intervene to remedy situations where the price, quantity, quality, or availability of a service is considered inadequate. have secured regulatory arbitrage 2 opportunities to saddle competitors with comparatively greater government oversight and regulatory burdens, or to secure government-conferred benefits that translate into a lower cost of doing business. In the United States, incumbent carriers have succeeded in convincing legislators and regulators of the need to create investment incentives, particularly for costly next generation network ("NGN") 3 infrastructure, but also to refrain from policy making that creates investment disincentives. In the worst case scenario, incumbent carriers secure unwarranted and premature deregulation, despite an ongoing need to guard against anticompetitive practices and to promote sustainable competition. Governments also risk providing direct financial subsidies, or creating a regulatory mechanism for indirect subsidies, to stimulate infrastructure investment when in fact no such catalyst was necessary in light of competitive necessity. This paper will examine how stakeholders in the U.S. have gamed the incentive creation process to generate maximum market distortion and competitive advantage. The paper suggests that the U.S. government has rewarded incumbents with artificially lower risk, insulation from 2
The FCC defined regulatory arbitrage as "businesses making decisions based on regulatory classifications rather than on customers' preferences and innovative and sustainable business plans." Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, Internet over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Cable Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4846 (2002) . See also, Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 227 (2004) . Next generation networks refer to upgrades to existing telecommunications and information services that implement cutting edge technological advances. These networks will provide conduits for delivering high definition, multi-media content and services that require large amounts of bandwidth and extremely fast bitrates. For example, next generation high definition television may offer three dimensional format requiring networks capable of delivering 45 million bits per second. competition, and partial underwriting of technology projects that these carriers otherwise would have to undertake unilaterally. The paper provides recommendations on how governments can calibrate the incentive creation process for maximum consumer benefit instead of individual carrier gain.
I. Next Generation Network Incentive Creation in the United States
The cost and perceived risk in NGN investment have motivated incumbent telecommunications carriers to leverage financial commitments in exchange for government conferred financial incentives. Despite significant reduction in revenues accruing from core revenue streams, such as voice telephony, and despite constant claims that they must tirelessly compete in all industry sectors, incumbent carriers have not aggressively sought to make broadband Internet access a major focus for investment 4 even though it constitutes a component in the triple-or quadruple-play bundle of telephony, Internet access, and video programming services incumbents now emphasize.
4 "The U.S. broadband industry has not been investing enough to meet this growth in demand. The U.S. international ranking in several measures of broadband connectivity has fallen dramatically over the past decade. There is a growing consensus that the federal government has been overly reliant on free market/private enterprise solutions to our broadband needs, while other nations have been moving forward with government sponsored efforts to promote broadband deployment and use." Comments By EDUCAUSE, Internet2 and ACUTA, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future (undated) "Further, the Commission recognized that, in order effectively to compete for the provision of broadband services, the BOCs generally would need to upgrade their networks substantially with new fiber technologies. However, because section 271 unbundling obligations create disincentives for the BOCs to make substantial investments in these new fiber technologies, in accord with our nation's policy goals of trying to provide all carriers, including BOCs, with incentives to make such investments, the Commission concluded that forbearance relief was justified." Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 160(C) in the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 19415, 19468 (2005 The FCC regularly shows how well it has gotten the message that it must remove NGN investment disincentives and take affirmative steps to create incentives. For example, in assessing why rural areas in the U.S. suffer from limited and costly broadband service options, the FCC noted that to "help stimulate and sustain demand for broadband services in rural areas, both public and private entities should consider developing consumer education and training initiatives, broadband affordability programs, and other incentives to achieve sustainable penetration rates."
The FCC has accommodated this campaign by classifying broadband, Internet access as a robustly competitive information service. "the characteristics of the broadband market, as well as evidence that facilities-based wireline carriers have incentives to make, and indeed already make, broadband transmission capacity available to ISPs, absent regulation, are factors that influence our analysis in determining whether such regulation is still necessary. Moreover, this regulation can have a significant impact on the ability of wireline platform providers to develop and deploy innovative broadband capabilities that respond to market demands. The record shows that the additional costs of an access mandate diminish a carrier's incentive and ability to invest in and deploy broadband infrastructure investment. We find this negative impact on deployment and innovation particularly troubling in view of Congress' clear and express policy goal of ensuring broadband deployment, and its directive that we remove barriers to that deployment, if possible, consistent with our other obligations under the Act. It is precisely this negative impact on broadband infrastructure that led the Commission to eliminate other broadband-related regulation over the past two years. These factors, when weighed against the benefits of continuing these regulations . . .." Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, 14877-87 (2005) . A "continued obligation to provide any new broadband transmission capability to all ISPs indiscriminately [as a common carrier, telecommunications service], and provide advance notice thereof, would reduce incentives to develop innovative wireline broadband capabilities and places wireline broadband at a substantial competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis cable modem and other broadband Internet access service providers. Id. at 14905.
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Bringing Broadband to Rural America: Report on a Rural Broadband Strategy, 2009 WL 3362778, ¶13 (Oct. 19, 2009 . "The principles that will protect the open Internet are an essential step to maximize investment and innovation in the network and on the edge of it --by establishing rules of the road that incentivize competition, empower entrepreneurs, and grow the economic pie to the benefit of all." Prepared Remarks of Chairman Julius Genachowski, Preserving a Free and On the matter of stimulating broadband access everywhere FCC Commissioner Robert McDowell expressed the need for combining incentive creation with even more deregulation:
[I]t is essential that our plan give current and prospective broadband network and service providers the proper incentives to deploy new technologies. We must also provide entrepreneurs with the flexibility to make full use of all available spectrum, including the television white spaces, to backhaul broadband traffic. In order to attract investors to fund the buildout of new networks, we must not engage in rulemakings that produce whimsical regulatory arbitrage. Rather, we must allow market players to succeed or fail on their own merits and not due to the government picking winners and losers. In short, our rules must allow network operators to have a reasonable opportunity to pay back their investors. That's the only way to improve existing networks and build new ones.
17
Notwithstanding incumbent carriers' opposition to statutory and regulatory initiatives designed to promote competition, these very same carriers are the primary beneficiaries of financial subsidies designed to promote universal access to affordable basic voice services. 
21
"As the Aug. 20 deadline nears to apply for $4.7 billion in broadband grants, AT&T, Verizon and Comcast are unlikely to go for the stimulus money, sources close to the companies said.
Their reasons are varied. All three say they are flush with cash, enough to upgrade and expand their broadband networks on their own. Some say taking money could draw unwanted scrutiny of business practices and compensation, as seen with automakers and banks that have taken government bailouts. And privately, some companies are griping about conditions attached to the money, including a net-neutrality rule that they say would prevent them from managing carriers are resorting to another type of investment holdout in the expectation that they could secure more favorable terms, including less burdensome nondiscrimination requirements.
II.
Even Id.
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Id.
37
Id. at 4.
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presidential administrations, the U.S. government no longer has a "mission accomplished" 39 attitude and now concludes that it must remedy market failure, create incentives for infrastructure investment, particularly in rural areas, do a better job of mapping and benchmarking actual network availability, and subsidize access. Curiously, incumbent carriers have very little to say about such a major undertaking, nor have these carriers submitted applications to receive a portion of the available funding.
A. Broadband Development as Part of a National Economic Development Strategy
Both the Obama Administration and a majority in Congress consider broadband development, especially in rural areas, an important element in a national strategy to spur The Agriculture Department's $2.5 billion will support a Distance Learning, Telemedicine, and Broadband Program with financial grants, loans, or loan guarantees. The law requires that 75% of the area to be served by a project receiving financial support shall be in a rural area without sufficient access to high speed broadband service to facilitate rural economic. The law establishes a priority for projects that provide service to the highest proportion of rural residents that do not have access to broadband service and that offer end users a choice of more than one service provider. This program also establishes priority access for the telephone and cable television companies that currently have telecommunications loans, or have previously borrowed money under the RUS program. Additionally, funds from the Agriculture department's allocation cannot support any project already receiving funding under the NTIA Program.
The law also requires the FCC, no later than 1 year after enactment, to provide a Report to Congress containing a national broadband plan. The plan should seek to ensure that all people of the U.S. have access to broadband capability and should specify benchmarks for meeting that goal.
The plan also must include an analysis of the most effective and efficient ways to ensure broadband access using a detailed strategy to ensure affordability including evaluation of ongoing projects and grants. The law also requires NTIA to develop and maintain a web-based, comprehensive nationwide inventory map of existing broadband service capability and availability in the U.S. with specific information about the geographic reach of specific commercial networks, or public providers throughout each state.
The final version of the law lacks definitions for such key words as "unserved," "underserved," "broadband," and "high-speed broadband." This means that the involved government agencies, in consultation with the states and grant seekers, will have to establish baseline criteria that could easily include underserved urban areas in addition to remote locales.
The law also does not establish a preference for any type of broadband technology, nor does it favor public sector over commercial ventures, except for the preference for existing or previous RUS program borrowers.
B. National Broadband Policy
To meet its statutory deadline for delivering a national broadband plan to Congress by Id. at ¶1.
• Strategies for achieving affordability and maximum utilization of broadband infrastructure and services;
• Evaluation of the status of broadband deployment, including the progress of related grant programs; and
• How to use broadband to advance consumer welfare, civic participation, public safety and homeland security, community development, health care delivery, energy independence and efficiency, education, worker training, private sector investment, entrepreneurial activity, job creation, and economic growth, and other national purposes.
The FCC recognizes that even though American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $7.2 billion for broadband infrastructure development that sizeable sum will not achieve the Congressional goal of nationwide broadband deployment. Accordingly, the Commission must See http://www.broadband.gov/.
47 place the government in the role as primary underwriter and initial anchor tenant user, or as a possible anchor tenant willing to await private sector investment. In the former, the U.S. government incubated and largely financed the first networks that eventually became backbone networks for the Internet. In the latter, the U.S. government secures bids from private contractors offering to construct or configure telecommunications capacity for the requirements of one or more agencies.
Absent a decision by incumbent carriers to ramp up their NGN investment unilaterally it appears that the government will have to take further affirmative steps to stimulate investment.
Such investment stimulation should not reward incumbents' laggard investment, but instead generate new investment by anyone willing to commit to near term projects. Simply put, incumbent carriers may have alerted decision makers to the need for more proactive involvement, but in responding to this provocation the U.S. government should seek out and partially underwrite undertakings of others willing to act immediately.
A. Adopt Global Best Practices
While political factors prevent the FCC from embracing some globally proven broadband development policies, there are many initiatives the Commission can undertake without a new legislative mandate. Global best practices, which for the most part occur outside the United States, offer guidance on how to stimulate both supply of broadband capacity and demand for broadband services, the latter largely ignored in the United States. Many nations accept a comparatively more active and interventionist role for government leading to public/private partnerships in NGN Finland, 10 INFO 107-120 (2008); Michel Berne, Telecommunications universal service in France, 10 INFO No. 5/6, 121-137 (2008) .
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See Openreach, Keeping the UK Connected; available at: http://www.openreach.co.uk/orpg/aboutus/Downloads/web_corp_brochure.pdf (explaining the structural separation of British Telecom).
• Promoting digital literacy, i.e., the ability to use digital technologies to pursue information, communications and entertainment interests;
• Investing in infrastructure, aggregating demand, and serving as an anchor tenant;
• Fostering facilities-based competition;
• Creating incentives for private investment and disincentives for litigation and other delay tactics;
• Offering electronic government services, including healthcare, education, access to information, and licensing;
• Promoting universal service through subsidies and grants; and
• Revising and reforming governmental safeguards to promote a high level of trust, security, privacy, and consumer protection in NGN services, including electronic commerce.
B. Top/Down Models
Broadband development strategies typically fit into two general tactics: 1) government seeks to stimulate the production of broadband facilities and services through incentives and subsidies that increase supply; and/or 2) government seeks to stimulate end user demand for broadband facilities and services. The U.S. government has focused almost exclusively on supply stimulation, with little concern for demand stimulation that could occur in programs to enhance computer literacy, access, and ownership. For example, the current e-rate program offers no funds for training teachers and students on how to maximize the value of NGN access.
The Top/Down model emphasizes governments' role in articulating a broadband vision, with or without input and participation from stakeholders and prospective beneficiaries. In this model, governments articulate a national broadband plan and establish service definitions, goals, and ways to measure success. An emphasis on expanding the supply of broadband capacity prompts governments to stimulate access by: near ubiquitous access to basic telephone service without the expense, corruption, administrative red tape, and delays as has occurred in the U.S. Many nations can consider broadband access a necessary and logical extension of the existing basic services access mission without bankrupting subsidy programs, risking "compassion fatigue" among telecommunications users obligated to subsidize the program, and having to create excessive incentives for carriers to participate. Best practices nations increase supply of broadband services through infrastructure funding, investment incentives, such as loan guarantees and tax credits, and grants for NGN research and education.
They do not "throw money at the problem" indiscriminately, but instead offer only partial funding thereby obligating grant seekers to aggregate demand among many constituencies.
The U.S. Universal Service program currently funds carriers almost exclusively, taking as a given the carriers' cost estimates. E-rate beneficiaries create islands of broadband access which they cannot extend into the community, or share with eager users who do not qualify as a school, library, clinic, or hospital. Remarkably many state legislatures have expressed open hostility to attempts by municipal governments to invest in NGN infrastructure such as city-wide Wi-Fi broadband networks. For example, in Pennsylvania the dominant incumbent carrier Verizon, lobbied and secured a law that gives the company the right of first refusal whenever a municipality (other than the city of Philadelphia) seeks to operate a broadband network.
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Best practices nations have reallocated spectrum to support wireless broadband options, including use of the "Digital Dividend" by reallocating "refarmed" analog television bandwidth. The U.S. has reallocated some of the analog television spectrum, but with an eye toward maximizing current revenue the FCC auctioned off the spectrum to the highest bidder without earmarking any spectrum for market entrants. Incumbent carriers acquired the vast majority of the new spectrum and aggressively opposed the one initiative the FCC undertook to promote access by requiring that the winning bidder for one bloc of spectrum allow users to use any technically compatible device for access.
Best practices nations promote broadband fiber optic network deployment, especially into and across rural areas.
57 They also stimulate competition through broadband services resale, including local loop unbundling, 58 and shared access to fiber optic lines and rights of way. Such public sector intervention comes across as too intrusive in the U.S., yet these initiatives regularly achieve greater broadband penetration and other evidence of successful NGN deployment. Nations forcing incumbent carriers to restructure their operations, or to share network facilities, do not embrace socialism and reject marketplace competition. Unlike the U.S., they recognize that the 57 "For new build fibre deployments, if it is apparent that there is only one telecoms access network then we would expect the operator of that network to provide access to it on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis through fit for purpose wholesale access products. Our approach applies equally to all new build fibre developments and operators. stakes are too high to allow businesses to game the political and regulatory process with an eye toward extracting more market distorting, government-conferred advantages. Best practices nations do not allow incumbent carriers to delay necessary NGN investment until such time as the nation is disadvantaged competitively in a globally integrated information economy that increasingly relies on broadband networks to function.
In the middle and longer term, best practices nations seek to stimulate market-driven competition, while continuing to track progress. They promote facilities-based competition from multiple platforms including retrofited fixed line telephone networks, cable television plant, wireless, fiber optic links, and the powerline grid. Additionally, these nations monitor incumbent carrier market share and assess the need for structural separation or other precompetitive regulatory and competition policy (antitrust) initiatives. They support reseller transition to facilities-based competition, and they engage in comprehensive mapping, data collection, statistical reporting, and quality of service assessments. With such close monitoring of progress, best practices nations can calibrate deregulation with the state of actual and sustainable facilities-based competition. Where market failures persist, they can calibrate and target subsidies to improve broadband accessibility and affordability in chronically unserved and underserved areas, promote research and development in new broadband technologies, reallocate additional spectrum for broadband services as demand grows, and expand the definition of universal service to cover broadband targets.
C. Bottom/Up Models
Best practices nations also show an appreciation for the need to stimulate the demand for
NGNs and the services they deliver. Bottom/Up models stimulate demand for broadband capacity and Internet-mediated services with government becoming an early adopter of NGN-mediated services and an underwriter of programs designed to enhance digital literacy, i.e., the skills needed to use NGNs for enhancing social and personal utility. Nations evidencing best practices seek to use NGNs to provide e-government and education services, promote creation of digital content, support the acquisition of digital literacy skills by the citizenry, and convene workshops and other outreach campaigns to solicit advice from all stakeholders and constituencies.
Bottom/Up models concentrate on educating individuals and institutions so that they can exploit broadband technologies for individual and collective gain. Programs designed to promote demand for broadband service combine digital literacy campaigns with other initiatives such as offering free or subsidized computers and support for the creation of digital content. These models recognize that simply building out infrastructure does not guarantee widespread use unless and until prospective users understand how these networks can offer faster, better, smarter, cheaper, and more convenient solutions to existing wants, needs, and desires.
Digital literacy campaigns concentrate on devising and using broadband (Internetmediated) services that enhance access to education, job training, employment searches, telemedicine, and other government services. Unlike supply-side programs, Bottom/Up campaigns can funnel grant money to "community champions" and broadband demand aggregators in addition to carriers. Additionally, governments can enhance users' confidence in using NGNs, which process confidential information, by addressing consumer protection issues including, privacy, network reliability, security and neutrality, and competition policy issues.
IV. Conclusion
Excessive confidence in the virtues of market driven incentives and investment has convinced decision makers in the U.S. largely to eschew efforts to stimulate investment in NGN.
Such reliance in marketplace resource allocation has left the U.S. in a comparatively mediocre position in terms of most measures of progress in broadband deployment. NGN access can
